Seven Pines - May 1862

The following is an account of the refight of the Battle of Seven Pines using 6mm miniatures and the Volley & Bayonet rules a few days before the 160th anniversary of the historical battle. The scenario can be found in the “A Storm in the Valley 1862” a Volley & Bayonet scenario book developed by Jessee Scarborough. A point of note is reinforcement schedules are determined with a degree of randomisation, therefore they differ from those in the historical battle and add a fog of war.

Around noon on the 31st of May 1862 General Joseph Johnston spurred his horse into motion. He was well aware that his plan for his Confederate divisions to converge on the Union forces at Seven Pines was well behind schedule. Yet he was determined to encourage his generals forward with all haste.

As dispatch riders galloped north and south Johnston moved along the Williamsburg Road to encourage Longstreet forward directly. If Longstreet moved with vigour he could easily support Daniel Harvey Hill’s division who was now further east. To the north Whiting moved via Nine Mile Road while to the south Huger should be moving along Charles City Road. For a moment Johnston considered the possibility of failure, but it was short lived. Victory was surely within his grasp, Richmond would be saved.

Meanwhile near Seven Pines General Keyes, commander of the Union IV Corps had deployed his two divisions. They comprised the divisions of Couch & Casey and were deployed in a generally linear manner. The left flank of Couch’s division deployed slightly east of White Owl Swamp and from here stretched north towards Casey’s division nearer Fair Oaks. The six brigades were placed behind a series of hasty works. 

Despite the preparations to date the Union line was not fully prepared for such a massed attack. Trepidation filled the line when D.H Hill’s grey clad soldiers moved forward from the woods to their front. By 1pm Hill’s Rebels, some 10,000 men, began to deploy opposite the Union line, weighted somewhat to Couch’s front. Indeed, Innes Palmer, one of three brigade commanders in Casey's Division would admit he was so surprised by the Rebel firing that he had to bolt for safety from his tent, leaving behind his midday meal and all his personal belongings, including a letter from his wife.

Above, a view from Hill’s lines. Fair Oaks is in the left while Seven Pines, marked by the road junction is in the rear. Below, a view along the line looking south. Fair Oaks is in the foreground. 

Keyes acted with decisiveness and sent dispatch riders to alert Heintzelman and Sumner, commanders of III Corps and II Corps respectively. Keyes quick action paid dividends. Even by 1.30pm Hooker’s division was advancing rapidly towards Seven Pines.

Yet as Union reinforcements moved towards the battlefield D.H Hill seemed content to reorientate his division. Instead of engaging Couch directly, and driving against Seven Pines by the most direct route, Hill moved north to a position nearer Nine Mile Road and Fair Oaks, clearly with an intent to engage Casey’s division. This, General Hill believed, would allow the divisions of Longstreet and Whiting to more quickly deploy and support his attack. Below, Hill’s division moves north.

Around 2pm Longstreet’s division entered the field with Johnston in attendance, astride the Williamsburg Road. Longstreet’s division comprised another six brigades, some 12,000 bayonets. Yet despite their arrival considerable time was spent deploying the division. Johnston, his dander up, moved forward to obtain a clearer view.

Below, three brigades of Longstreet’s division advance. Two brigades have deployed in to field formation while that in the foreground remains in road column. Other brigades are backed up on the Williamsburg Road.

As Hill completed his deployment of his troops for his intended attack around Fair Oaks reports alerted him to further Union reinforcements advancing from the north. In particular Richardson’s division from Sumner’s corps who, having crossed Chickahominy River at Grapevine Bridge, would bolster Keyes’ flank. It is worth noting that II Corps commander Brigadier General Edwin Sumner had faced some criticism of his handling of the Williamsburg battle earlier in the campaign. Today he seemed determined, at least initially, to press the Rebels at the first opportunity.

Undeterred, around 3pm Hill interspersed several brigades between both Richardson’s and Casey’s divisions before launching a series of attacks on the right flank of Casey’s division. A string of attacks by various brigades now occurred against Casey’s exposed forces, with Joe Johnston frequently spurring on the butternut clad soldiers in person.

Above, Hill unleashes his attack on the Union right flank around Fair Oaks. Below, a view from the north with elements of Richardson’s division moving to reinforce the Union right.

Below, Richardson’s division, now deployed from road column and  advances on Hill’s position. The attack however was held and heavy casualties inflicted on Richardson regiments.

With Hill’s attack well underway Whiting’s division began to enter the field, a further six Rebel brigades. Johnston’s spirits were buoyed despite the fact that these reinforcements were strung out in road column and considerable time would be required to deploy them.

The attacks continued against the Union forces with unrelenting ferocity with Anderson’s brigade being particularly active. Below, the general situation clearly showing the Confederate focus on the Union forces around Fair Oaks.

For some two hours Johnston had been active directing Hill's brigades forward, often very near the front. One young staff officer with him instinctively ducked whenever a bullet sang past. Johnston, a veteran of hostile fire in the old army and five times wounded laughed and told him, "Colonel, there is no use dodging: when you hear them they have passed." Yet soo after, just after 4pm, Johnston was wounded by a bullet and moments later fragments of a shell. Carried from the field his loss caused command confusion within the Rebel line.

By 5pm Hill and Whiting, having regained some semblance of control, continued to press Casey’s weakened division. By 5.30pm Casey’s division had collapsed, with Palmer’s and Wessell’s brigades decimated. Yet the Rebel attacks at Fair Oaks continued as Union reinforcements were hastily thrown into line. 

Below around 7pm another Rebel attack around Fair Oaks with Hood’s, Hampton’s and Pickett’s brigades, all from Whiting’s division, press the weaken Union line. 

What of Union reinforcements, including those mentioned above? Keyes had placed great hope in the arrival of Richardson’s division but the division had become bogged down and with casualties mounting Sumner moved to the defensive, at least until the arrival of Sedgwick’s division - assuming that it would arrive! Below, Hill’s weakened division faces the near exhausted elements of Richardson’s division deployed on the high ground some distance from the Chickahominy River.

Elsewhere it will be recalled that Heintzelman had been prompt to order Hooker’s division west to reinforce Keyes. Hooker’s division arrived on the field around 1.30pm. One brigade deploying to south to protect against a Rebel advance across White Owl Creek while the remaining two brigades bolstered the centre. Around 3.30pm Kearny’s division also arrived on the field. Again valuable time was lost as the various brigades deployed from march column. However, by 6.30pm the division was heavily involved in the fighting which stretched from the now crumbling position around Fair Oaks to the rapidly deteriorating position just west of Seven Pines.

What of Longstreet? His division arrived on the field around around 3pm with the first of his brigades shaking out soon after. However, time and terrain would slow the full deployment of the division down considerably and the full division was not positioned as Old Pete required until around 5.30pm. 

Finally, at 7pm the division struck the Union left flank. The attacks, like those against the Union right were delivered with ferocity. 

By 8pm Union resolve had broken. Casey’s division was shattered while the divisions of Kearney and Richardson were near exhaustion. It seemed Joe Johnston’s attack had, despite its complexity, been successful. 

However, with Johnston wounded President Davis would need another commander, just as had been the case in 1862. That of course is another story...

This was without doubt a great refight with the scenario mechanics capturing extremely well the issues of troops arriving on the field and frustratingly at unclear times. This was managed by a card draw system for reinforcements. In our refight for example Huger did not arrive, as was the case historically, but without doubt the Confederate commander was certainly hoping it would, potentially unhinging the Union left.

The miniatures here are from my own collection and are from the Heroics & Ros 6mm range. They are based on 1.5” bases. One inch on the table represents 200 yards and each infantry stand a brigade of some 2,000 to 2,500 men.

As is often the case with these reports I have woven in a few historical descriptions in this report from the actual battle. For an excellent description of this campaign, including this battle, I would strongly recommend "To The Gates of Richmond" by Stephen Sears.